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The Constitutional Future of the
All-English Ballot
In 1922, Justice Holmes remarked, "[Ilt is desirable that all citizens
of the United States should speak a common tongue."' While this
statement may reflect a social policy that has existed in America from
the inception of the nation, the goal simply has not come to pass.
An estimated thirty million persons, whose mother tongue is not
English, reside in the United States.2 This figure represents over eleven
percent of the population. Additional reports estimate over one per-
cent of the United States population speaks English not well or not
at all.3 The problem of English illiteracy necessarily affects many
aspects of life in the United States, including the right to vote.
In 1975, Congress addressed this problem of English illiteracy by
amending the 1965 Voting Rights Act.' The amendment established
a ten year experiment, mandating the use of bilingual ballots and voting
materials in certain geographical areas of the country.' Congress
recently extended the life of federal law title 42, United States Code
Section 1973aa-la, the bilingual ballot provision, to the year 1992.6
Many Californians do not agree with this federal action and on
November 6, 1984, voiced their opinion through the passage of Initia-
tive Statute 38. 7 The initiative statute requires the Governor of Califor-
nia to write to the President of the United States, the United States
Attorney General, and all members of Congress, a communication
urging that ballots, voter pamphlets, and all other official voting materials
be printed in English only."
The goal of Initiative Statute 38 is to establish an English-only
voting ballot in California. 9 This can be achieved through two different
legislative routes: (1) Congress may repeal the federal bilingual ballot
statute, thereby allowing California to enact English-only voting legisla-
tion; or (2) Congress may amend the present federal law'0 to man-
1. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 412 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. See Waggoner, Statistics on Language Use, in LANGUAoE iN Tm U.S.A. 486, 490 (1981).
3. See N. CONKLIN & M. LAurRm, A HOST OF TONGuEs 3 (1983).
4. 42 U.S.C. §1973aa-la.
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. See California Secretary of State, California Ballot Pamphlet 50 (General Election
November 6, 1984).
8. See id. at 51.
9. Id. at 52.
10. 42 U.S.C. §1973aa-la.
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date the uniform use of English-only voting materials. Under either
alternative, if the goal of Initiative Statute 38 is achieved legislatively,
the problem of language minority voting rights will be shifted to a
judicial forum.
This author will examine the constitutional future of the goal of
Initiative Statute 38 and establish that the goal cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny. The right of a state to determine franchise
qualifications initially will be focused upon," with particular emphasis
on the historical use and eventual ban of literacy tests.'" The 1975
congressional amendments to the Voting Rights Act'3 and Initiative
Statute 38 then will be explored.' 4 Furthermore, this author will identify
the judicial trend toward expansion of the fundamental voting right
to encompass the effective ability to cast a political choice.'" This
examination will reveal the constitutional infirmities of the proposed
English-only ballot under the United States Constitution. 6 Finally,
a similar analysis will exhibit the problems that an English-only ballot
will encounter under the California Constitution." To provide a clear
understanding of the constitutional issues involved, a preliminary
discussion of the right of a state to determine voter qualifications
is necessary.
STATE AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH VOTER QUALIFICATIONS
The right to vote is a political right.' 8 Through express and implied
provisions of the United States Constitution, the individual states tradi-
tionally have established voter qualifications for both state and federal
elections.' 9 Article I section 2 of the Constitution,20 read with the seven-
teenth amendment, 2' provides that in elections of United States Repre-
sentatives and Senators, the electors of each state shall have the qualifica-
tions required for electors of the most numerous branch of the legislature
of that state. 2 The valid use of this state authority can be seen in
11. See infra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 40-67 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 92-128 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 151-81 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
18. See Pirtle v. Brown, 118 F.2d 218, 220 (6th Cir. 1941).
19. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAWv 765 (2d
ed. 1983) (describing the history of state established voter qualifications).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 1.
21. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII, §1.
22. Id.
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the various citizenship and residency qualifications that the states cur-
rently employ.23
The right to control voter qualifications, however, does not rest
exclusively with the states.24 The right of a state to control federal
elections is subject to congressional power under article I, section 4
of the United States Constitution. 2- In the 1932 case of Smiley v.
Holm,2 6 Chief Justice Hughes interpreted the constitutional authority
of Congress over the election of the United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives to go far beyond the actual wording found in the Consti-
tution.27 Hughes asserted that the comprehensive words of the provi-
sion imbued Congress with the authority to provide a complete code of
congressional elections.28 The Chief Justice concluded that this inter-
pretation was necessary for Congress to enact the numerous re-
quirements for procedure and safeguards that experience reveals are
necessary to enforce the fundamental right of voting. 29 The federal
supremacy over state voter qualification authority was expanded by
the 1969 Supreme Court ruling of Kramer v. Union Free School
District." In Kramer, the Court abandoned the traditional deferen-
tial review of the state voting statutes and announced that any device
that burdens the right to vote should be subjected to strict scrutiny.3'
Amendments to the Constitution have placed additional restrictions
on the ability of states to impose voting requirements.3 2 The fifteenth
amendment prohibits the states from impairing the franchise on the
basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 3 The nine-
teenth amendment forbids sex discrimination in voting. 4 The twenty-
fourth amendment prevents the states from imposing any voting tax
on a person before that person can vote for a candidate for a federal
23. See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. II, §2 (describing the citizenship and residency requirements
of California).
24. See L. TRiBE, AzmcAN CONSTITuTioNAL LAW 761-62 (1978).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §4, cl. 1. The clause provides: "The Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators." Id.
26. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
27. Id. at 366.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
31. See id. at 626. The application of the strict scrutiny standard will result in holding
all franchise restrictions unconstitutional unless the restriction is necessary to promote a com-
pelling state interest. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
32. See J. NowvAi, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 19, at 765.
33. See U.S. CONSr. amend. XV.
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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office." The twenty-sixth amendment grants voting rights to all citizens
of the United States who are eighteen years or older.
3 6
Thus, the Constitution allocates to the states the right to make laws
regarding state and national elections, but provides that if Congress
becomes dissatisfied with the state laws, Congress can alter them."
This congressional right has been expanded by case law." Further-
more, various constitutional amendments, enacted to protect the voting
rights of various minority citizens, have placed additional specific
limitations on the right of a state to establish voter qualifications.39
An illustrative example of this procedure is the historical use of literacy
tests as a method of voter qualification.
A. The Use of Literacy Tests
The use of a literacy test as a device to restrict certain minorities
from the polls has a long and pernicious history.4" A typical literacy
test required all voter applicants to be able to read and write English
before the applicants could exercise their right to vote.4 Many southern
states included in their state constitutions a "grandfather clause,"
'4 2
which exempted white illiterates from the literacy test because they
were lineal descendants of persons entitled to vote on January 1, 1866. 43
The use of a literacy test coupled with a grandfather clause allowed
illiterate whites to vote but effectively denied the franchise to the
majority of southern blacks until 1913, when the Supreme Court held
that the use of a grandfather clause was unconstitutional.44
This ruling, however, did not dissuade the use of state literacy tests,
and as late as 1960, the Supreme Court upheld the valid application of
these tests. "5 The case of Lassiter v. Northampton County Board46
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
37. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 123 (1970).
38. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
40. See generally Garcia, Language Barriers to Voting: Literacy Tests and the Bilingual
Ballot, 6 CoLtrm. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 83, 85-89 (1974) (recounting the discriminatory use
of literacy tests).
41. See People ex. rel. Chadbourne v. Voorhis, 141 N.E. 907, 910 (N.Y. 1923).
42. A "grandfather clause" has been defined as an exception to a restriction that allows
all those already doing something to continue doing so even if they would be stopped by the
new restriction. See BAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 629 (5th ed. 1979).
43. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364 (1913).
44. See id. The decision invalidated the grandfather clause of the Oklahoma State Con-
stitution. Id. The Court found that the clause violated the fifteenth amendment because the
obvious effect of the clause was to impose the literacy test upon former slaves and their descen-
dants. Id.
45. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Board, 360 U.S. 45, 52 (1960).
46. 360 U.S. 45 (1960).
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upheld the literacy test of North Carolina by concluding that the ability
to read and write has a rational relationship to standards designed
to promote the intelligent use of the ballot.17 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court reasoned that although literacy and intelligence are
not synonymous, the reliance of society on printed materials to canvass
campaign issues may justify a state in allowing only those persons
who are literate to exercise the franchise.
4 8
Five years later, however, the Court decided the cases of United
States v. Mississippi,49 and Louisiana v. United States,50 in which the
Court finally recognized the discriminatory use of these tests . 5' The
Mississippi Constitution required a voter applicant to possess the ability
to read, understand, and interpret any provision of the state
constitution.52 Good moral character and the ability to fill out the
required forms properly were further prerequisites for voting. 3 The
Louisiana statute required the voter applicant to state a reasonable
interpretation of any clause in the Louisiana or federal constitutions
54
and gave state officials virtually unlimited discretion in administering
the test." Recognizing the discriminatory result of these tests, the Court
enjoined future use, calling them a "trap, sufficient to stop even the
most brilliant man on his way to the voting booth." 56
The Mississippi and Louisiana decisions were given legislative support
when Congress passed the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 7 which prohibited
the discriminatory use of literacy tests wherever they had been used
in the past.58 Finally in 1970, Congress enacted a nationwide ban on
all literacy tests.59 The constitutionality of this ban was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mitchell.60 After reviewing the
historical use of literacy tests to reduce voter participation in a
discriminatory manner, 6' the Mitchell Court determined that a
nationwide ban on literacy tests was necessary.62
47. Id. at 51.
48. Id. at 52.
49. 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
50. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
51. See Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 143.
52. See id. at 132.
53. See id. at 133.
54. See Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 148.
55. See id. at 150.
56. Id. at 153.
57. 42 U.S.C. §§1971-1974.
58. See id.
59. 42 U.S.C. §1973b.
60. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
61. See id. at 132.
62. Id. at 133. The Court said: "[F]aced with this and other evidence that literacy tests
reduce voter participation in a discriminatory manner not only in the South but throughout
1033
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With this background in mind, the reasons for the eventual ban
of all literacy tests can be seen as analogous to the proposed all English
ballot problem. Although the ban on literacy tests does not exclude
the non-English speaking citizen from the voting booth, an all English
ballot may work as effectively as the original literacy test in reducing
voter participation in a discriminatory manner. Congress considered
the problem of an English-only ballot of 1975. Howard A. Glickstein,
a noted authority,63 testified before Congress that overt discrimina-
tion was not the only factor limiting the political participation of
non-English speaking Americans."4 Mr. Glickstein asserted that since
most registration and election materials are printed in English, the
language barrier often has prevented these citizens from registering
or, once registered, from voting effectively.65 He concluded that this
barrier is as significant an impairment of the right to vote as any
literacy test used to deny the franchise to blacks. 6 Congress, apparently
persuaded by the testimony of Mr. Glickstein and others, subsequently
enacted a mandatory bilingual ballot provision as part of the 1975
amendments to the Voting Rights Act.67
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: 1975 AMENDMENTS
The United States Supreme Court in Lau v. Nichols 68 stated, "we
know that those who do not understand English are certain to find
their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and in no way
meaningful." ' 69 By substituting the word voting, in the above state-
ment, instead of the word classroom, one can begin to appreciate
the difficulties of the language minorities when they attempt to engage
in the political process. 70 The United States Commission on Civil
Rights, in a 1975 report to Congress,7' noted that English-only registra-
tion and voting restrained the political participation of voters whose
the Nation, Congress was supported by substantial evidence in concluding a nationwide ban
on literacy tests was appropriate to enforce the Civil War amendments." Id.
63. Mr. Glickstein is Director of the Center for Civil Rights at Notre Dame University
and was a key witness before the 1975 Subcommittee on the extension of the Voting Rights Act.
64. See EXTENSION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965: HEARINGS ON S.407, S.903, S.1297;
S.1409, S.1443 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 228 (1975) (statement of Howard A. Glickstein, Director of
the Center for Civil Rights at Notre Dame University).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. §1973aa-la.
68. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
69. Id. at 566.
70. See 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 795.
71. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS
AFTER, 117-21 (1975).
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primary language is not English. 72 The Commission also found that
despite high illiteracy rates for language minority citizens,7 3 state and
local areas where they resided continued to adhere to a uniform
language electoral system.74 With this background, Congress amended
the 1965 Voting Rights Act by enacting 42 U.S.C. section 1973aa-la.
This amendment mandates the use of bilingual voting ballots if two
factors co-exist.75 The first factor is met if the Director of the Cen-
sus determines that more than five percent of the citizens of voting
age in a state or political subdivision are members of a single language
minority.7 6 The second factor requires the English illiteracy rate of
such persons as a group be higher than the national rate.77 If both
factors co-exist, the state or political subdivision must provide all voter
information and materials, including ballots, in the applicable minority
language as well as in English.78 This two-prong test was adopted
by Congress in recognition that English-only voting materials used
in political subdivisions that contain no language minority citizens
do not act as a tool for discrimination and therefore should be allowed
to continue.7 9
The amendment was not viewed by Congress as a radical constitu-
tional step,8" but rather, as an extension of the legislative and con-
stitutional principles already approved by the Supreme Court.8" The
amendment was given a ten year life span, with the goal of the ex-
periment being to determine whether providing bilingual election
materials would facilitate voting on the part of language minority
citizens and bring them into the electoral process on an equal footing
with other citizens.82 Futhermore, the amendment rejects the notion
that the denial of a fundamental right is a necessary or appropriate
means of encouraging people to learn English.83
72. See id. at 117.
73. See 42 U.S.C. §1973aa-la(e) (defining the term "language minority citizen" as those
who are persons of Asian American, American Indian, Alaskan Natives, or Spanish Heritage).
74. See CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 70, at 796.
75. 42 U.S.C. §1973aa-la.
76. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
77. 42 U.S.C. §1973aa-la.
78. Id. §1973aa-la(c).
79. See CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 70, at 798.
80. See Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343, 345 (1975).
81. Id. The enforcement powers of the post-civil war amendments have been interpreted
broadly under the "remedial powers" of Congress. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 19, at 833-41. Supreme Court decisions also have suggested Congress may use subse-
quent legislation to redefine the meaning and scope of the constitutional guarantees of the
amendments. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
82. See CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 70, at 798-99.
83. Id. at 800.
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Although initially a temporary ten year measure,84 Congress recently
extended the bilingual election provision until 1992.11 The extension,
however, did not receive unanimous congressional support.86 Futher-
more, the extension was not fully supported by the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights,87 which originally proposed the legislation.88
A prominent member of the Commission 9 labeled the amendment
a "misguided experiment" and strongly urged Congress not to ex-
tend the minority language provisions of the Voting Rights Act.90 From
the strong support of California Initiative Statute 38, 9' many Califor-
nians apparently agree with those who urge the abandonment of the
bilingual ballot amendment.
INiTIATIvE STATUTE 38
California Initiative Statute 38 is a state declaration of public policy
concerning the official use of the English language. 9 The passage of
the statute requires the Governor of California to convey a communica-
tion to the President of the United States, the United States Attorney
General and to all members of the United States Congress, stating
that the people of California request that federal law be amended
so ballots, voter pamphlets, and all other official voting materials
can be printed in English only.
93
The ultimate goal of Initiative Statute 38, the establishment of an
"official" national language, 4 is not a novel suggestion. Although
the Constitution contains no reference to choice of a national language,
John Adams proposed the establishment of an English language in-
84. Id. at 798.
85. See 42 U.S.C. §1973aa-la(b).
86. See The Voting Rights Act, 40 CONG. Q. 1456 (1982).
87. Stephen Horn, member of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, strongly dissented
from the recommendation of the commission to extend the bilingual election provision. See
UNITED STATES COM111ISSION ON CIvil RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS,
94 (1981).
88. See THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS LATER, supra note 71, at 356.
89. Commissioner Stephen Horn.
90. UNITED STATES COMMSSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS, TIE VOTo RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLID
GOALS, 94 (1981).
91. The official result of the November 6, 1984 vote on California Initiative Statute 38
was 16,390,676 for; 2,645,599 against.
92. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 50.
93. Id. at 51. The actual text of the communication was:
The People of the State of California, recognizing the importance of a common
language in unifying our diverse nation hereby urge that Federal law be amended
so that ballots, voters' pamphlets and all other official voting materials shall be printed
in English only.
Id.
94. Id. at 52.
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stitute to promote the uniform use of the language." This and similar
proposals were rejected by the framers of the Constitution as incon-
sistent with the social make-up of the young country. 9 In 1917,
Theodore Roosevelt actively campaigned for a uniform national
language.97 He argued since there is but one flag "we must also have
but one language . . . we cannot tolerate any attempt to oppose or
supplant the language and culture that has come down to us from
the builders of this republic.''98 In April 1981, a constitutional amend-
ment that would establish English as the "official" language was
proposed. 99 This attempt, like Mr. Roosevelt's, found minimal sup-
port in Congress.' These numerous attempts at declaring English
the official national language reflect some of the policy justifications
behind Initiative Statute 38.
A. Policy Justifications for the Goals of Initiative Statute 38
The goal of Initiative Statute 38, the implementation of an all
English ballot, can be justified on several grounds. The first and
strongest justification is the desire that all United States citizens speak
a common language.' 1 An all English voting ballot would promote
this goal by motivating language minority citizens into full economic,
social, and political life. 2 In addition, the motivation to acquire the
use of English would discourage the perpetuation of language ghettos
currently found in many areas of the United States.
A second justification for the proposed all English ballot is that
the present use of bilingual ballots is unnecessary.0 3 Advocates of
this argument assert that since virtually all applicants for United States
citizenship must pass a test for English proficiency,0 4 bilingual ballots
are dispensable. 5 The persuasiveness of the first and second arguments
95. See Heath, English in our Language Heritage, in LANGUAGE IN THE U.S.A. 6 (1981).
96. Id.
97. See Wagner, America's Non-English Heritage, 19 SocmTY 37, 41 (1981).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 44.
100. Id.
101. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 51; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
412 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
102. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 52.
103. Id.
104. See 8 U.S.C. §1423. This section requires most candidates for United States citizen-
ship to demonstrate: (1) an understanding of the English language, including an ability to read,
write, and speak words in ordinary usage in the English language; (2) a knowledge and under-
standing of the fundamentals of the history and of the principles and form of government
of the United States. Id.
105. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 52; see also Wagner, supra note 97, at 41.
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is increased when the financial burden of bilingual ballots, the third
justification, is taken into account. 6
By adopting an English-only ballot, a state will avoid the cost and
administrative complexity entailed in providing a bilingual electoral
system.' 7 For example, the 1982 cost of bilingual voting materials
in California exceeded $1,200,000.10 These costs include the expense
of translating, printing, and distributing ballots, sample ballots, and
election pamphlets in various languages.'0 9 Additional expenses for
ballot counting also are foreseeable."10
Finally, a fourth justification is that the current use of bilingual
ballots in limited situations may be "inherently discriminatory.""'
If equal protection of the law requires voting rights assistance to
language minority citizens," 2 that assistance should be given to all
language minorities, not just to those who reach a certain percentage
of the overall population." 3 Despite these strong justifications against
the bilingual ballot, equally strong countervailing justifications for their
present use exist and must be explored.
B. Policy Justifications for a Bilingual Electoral System
The current law mandating the establishment of a bilingual electoral
system is supportable on a number of grounds. The first justification
is that the use of bilingual ballots allows all citizens to live and par-
ticipate in government free from discrimination." ' The Supreme Court
has held that facts and circumstances behind a state statute must be
considered in determining whether a state law violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The qualifications and
opportunity to vote in this country have a history of prevalence toward
106. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 52.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Castro v. State of California, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 241, 466 P.2d 244, 257, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 20, 33 (1970).
110. Id.
111. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 52; see also Tim VoTING RiGHTs AcT: UNFULnLLED
GoAts, supra note 90, at 94. Commissioner Stephen Horn asserted:
To argue that the provision of "equal protection of the laws" includes voting rights
assistance in the language of some minority group members and not others is to
pervert the meaning of a Constitution which was designed to protect the individual.
Equal protection is not a matter of group protection; it is a matter of individual
protection.
Id.
112. See infra note 75-78 and accompanying text.
113. See THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFFILLED GoALs, supra note 90, at 94.
114. See Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 7, at 53.
115. See William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
1038
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nativism." '6 Bilingual ballots secure protection from the inequities of
that history. In the tenth Federalist Paper, James Madison warned
his compatriots about the dangers of factionalism. He also noted,
however, that a selfish and intolerant majority is the worst faction of
all because they control the power to impose their will." 7
A second justification for a bilingual ballot concerns notions of
fundamental fairness." 8 Minority leaders assert that bilingual assistance
is needed for many citizens to cast their political vote effectively.'' 9
American citizenship may be obtained with only a fifth grade
understanding of the English language.'2 ° Many states, including
California, however, consistently have complex initiative statements
that must be understood and decided upon.'-' Thus, a fifth grade
understanding of the English language clearly is insufficient to cast
an effective ballot.
The third justification for the use of bilingual ballots is to increase
the voter participation of language minority citizens.' 2 During the
Congressional hearings on the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act, the Attorney General testified he believed literacy tests to be
a physical barrier to minority voting.' 23 More importantly, the Attorney
General stated that the tests are a psychological obstruction in the
minds of many minority citizens. 24 An English-only ballot will pose
a similar psychological deterrent to qualified voters who cannot read
English. 25
Finally, a fourth justification is that the cost and administrative
complexities of a bilingual electoral system would not outweigh the
constitutional right. 26 Avoidance of administrative costs, though a
valid concern, cannot justify imposition of otherwise improper
legislation. 27 Whether the English-only ballot is improper legislation,
however, has yet to be determined. 2 Thus, strong arguments can
116. See supra notes 40-67 and accompanying text. See generally THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT:
UNFULFULED GOALS, supra note 90, at 22, 34 (documenting minority harrassment and intimida-
tion with attempting to register and vote).
117. See The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison).




122. Id. at 52.
123. See Garcia, supra note 40, at 105 n.120.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Castro, 2 Cal. 3d at 241, 466 P.2d at 257, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
127. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 633 (1968).
128. See infra notes 151-81 and accompanying text.
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be put forth both in support of and against the proposed English-
only ballot. The proposal, however, also involves issues of constitu-
tional dimension. Whether or not an all English ballot will withstand
constitutional scrutiny is a question that should be addressed before
America will be prepared to deal with the vast cultural and political
problems that a bilingual society present.
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In 1885, the Supreme Court first recognized the political franchise
of voting as a fundamental ' " political right.' 0 Seventy-eight years
later, in the case of Reynolds v. Sims,'3' the Court reiterated the
fundamental nature of this right by asserting that the right to exer-
cise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner was preservative
of other basic civil and political rights.' 31 The Court concluded that
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be careful-
ly and meticulously scrutinized.' 33
The fundamental right to vote has been interpreted by various federal
courts to include not only the physical admission into a voting booth,
but also the right to cast effectively a political choice.'i The trend
was initiated in United States v. Louisiana,'35 in which the district
court required voting assistance to illiterate citizens.' 36 The court could
not impute to Congress the self-defeating notion that illiterates have
the right to vote, but not the right to know for whom they are
voting.' 37 Another case demonstrating the expanded right to vote is
Garza v. Smith.' s Here, the district court held that Texas had violated
the equal protection clause by providing electoral assistance to
physically disabled voters but denying assistance to illiterate voters. 3 9
The court concluded that the right to vote is nothing more than an
129. Fundamental rights have been defined as those that have their origin in the express
terms of the Constitution or which are necessarily to be implied from those terms. See BLAcK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 607 (5th ed. 1979). If legislation limits a fundamental right, the Court will
scrutinize closely the underlying factual basis for the legislation. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YoUNc, supra note 19, at 418.
130. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1885). A "political right" has been defined
as one that may be exercised in the formation or administration of the government. See BLACK'S
LAW DicTIONARY 1043 (5th ed. 1979).
131. 377 U.S. 533 (1963).
132. Id. at 562.
133. Id.
134. See infra notes 135-50 and accompanying text.
135. 265 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1966).
136. See id. at 708.
137. Id.
138. 320 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
139. See id. at 137.
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"empty ritual"' 40 if that right does not include a privilege to be in-
formed of the effect a given physical act of voting will produce.'
14
Puerto Rican Organization For Political Action v. Kusper4 2 was
the first case to apply the expanded voting right to non-English speak-
ing citizens. The Kusper decision ordered the Chicago Board of
Elections to provide bilingual assistance for Spanish speaking voters.'43
This was necessary, the court concluded, for the language minority
involved to register a political choice effectively. 14 In 1974, the Torres
v. Sachs'15 court followed suit by holding that the vote of Spanish
speaking citizens was seriously impaired by the lack of bilingual election
materials.'
4 6
The foregoing discussion indicates a judicial trend toward an
expansion of the definition of the right to vote.' 4 7 While the right
to vote originally was seen as providing merely access to the voting
booth,' the current interpretation finds the fundamental right to
include the opportunity for all qualified citizens to cast their political
choice effectively. 4 9 The impairment of this right, in any degree, raises
questions of equal protection. 5
A. Equal Protection of the Laws
As previously discussed, 5' the goal of Initiative Statute 38 can be
achieved by either a congressional repeal of the bilingual ballot law'52
and subsequent enactment by California of an English-only statute,
or by direct congressional amendment of the federal law'53 to require
English-only ballots. The constitutionality of the state law alternative
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 350 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
143. See id. at 611.
144. Id. at 610.
145. 381 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
146. See id. at 312. The court asserted:
In order that the phrase "the right to vote" be more than an empty platitude, a
voter must be able effectively to register his or her political choice. This involves
more than physically being able to pull a lever or marking a ballot. It is simply
fundamental that voting instructions and ballots, in addition to any other material
which forms part of the official communication to registered voters prior to an elec-
tion, must be in Spanish as well as English, if the vote of Spanish-speaking citizens
is not to be seriously impaired.
Id.
147. See supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 40-67 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
150. See L. TramE, supra note 24, at 1000.
151. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
152. 42 U.S.C. §1973aa-la.
153. Id.
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would require a fourteenth amendment equal protection clause
analysis.' 4 The federal statute alternative would raise fifth amend-
ment due process concerns.' 5
The fifth amendment originally was interpreted as providing no
guarantee against discriminatory legislation by Congress because the
amendment contained no express equal protection language.' 56 The
Supreme Court, however, has altered this view, asserting that the
approach to fifth amendment equal protection claims is precisely the
same as the equal protection approach under the fourteenth
amendment.'" Thus, an equal protection analysis with no distinction
between the fifth and fourteenth amendments will be applied to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the proposed English-only ballot.' 5'
Although notions of equal treatment for purposes of equal protec-
tion do change,'5 9 the Supreme Court has developed a two-tiered' 6 '
standard of review to determine the existence of equal protection
violations.' 6' The first tier consists of a "rational basis test,"' 62 a
restrained standard of review by which the Court essentially defers
to legislative judgement.'63 The second tier consists of "strict judicial
scrutiny,' 6 an active standard of review, triggered when a govern-
mental action either impairs a fundamental right or distinguishes a
suspect class.' 65
154. See R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 139 (1981).
155. Id.
156. See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1942).
157. See Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); see also Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 94-95 n.1 (1979). The footnote states:
Concern with assuring equal protection was part of the fabric of our Constitution
even before the Fourteenth Amendment expressed it most directly in applying it to
the states. . . . Accordingly, the Court has held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment forbids the Federal Government to deny equal protection of
the laws.
Id.
158. See Weinberger, supra note 157, at 638 n.2. But cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88, 100 (1975) (although both amendments require the same type of analysis they
differ because overriding national interests may exist that would allow selective federal legisla-
tion that would be unacceptable for an individual state).
159. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1965).
160. Although the Supreme Court never has formally established a third "middle" tier of
scrutiny, the Court occasionally applies a standard that requires the classification to serve im-
portant governmental objectives and to be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see also Comment, The Middle-Tier In
Action-An Equal Protection Analysis, 9 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 131, 138 (1982).
161. The traditional two-tiered approach was established in 1932. See Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1932). See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1065, 1067-1131 (1969) (reviewing the two-tiered approach of the Court).
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Since the two methods of achieving the goal of Initiative Statute
38 require legislation that would impair the fundamental right to
vote,'66 the Supreme Court will apply the second tier "strict scrutiny"
test. 67  Under a two-prong test, the suspect legislation will be
constitutionally invalid unless a compelling state interest is shown.
The second prong requires that the legislation be necessary to pro-
mote the interest found to be compelling.' 68
Two possible state interests that the proponents of the proposed
all English ballot would assert as compelling are: (1) the interest of
the state in maintaining a single language electoral system;' 69 and (2)
the interest of the state in encouraging non-English speaking citizens
to learn English.' 70 By applying the strict scrutiny test to the first
state interest above, the court will require the government to show
that the value of maintaining a single language electoral system is
so great that the interest justifies the limitation of the fundamental
right involved.' 7 ' The inquiry poses an initial problem with the con-
stitutional soundness of this asserted state interest. The underlying
motivation of the first interest is primarily financial. By using an all
English electoral system the state may avoid the financial burden that
a bilingual system demands. The interest also produces overall ad-
ministrative convenience to the state. The Supreme Court has recogniz-
ed administrative benefit and convenience as a valid state concern,' 72
but has held consistently that the benefit does not justify the impair-
ment of a fundamental right.'73 The first proposed interest raises ad-
ditional problems under the second prong of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard. This prong requires the Court to reach the conclusion that the
governmental action is necessary to promote the compelling state
166. See supra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
167. See J. NoWvAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 19, at 592.
168. Id.; see also Rosenstock v. Scaringe, 357 N.E.2d. 347, 348 (1976); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972). The Court described the application of this test as:
Thus phrased, the constitutional question may sound like a mathematical formula.
But legal "tests" do not have the precision of mathematical formulas. The key words
emphasize a matter of degree: that a heavy burden of justification is on the State,
and the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purposes.
Id. The difficulty of this review standard has been described as, "strict in theory and usually
fatal in fact." See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine of Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. REv. 1,
8 (1972).
169. See Castro, 2 Cal. 3d at 241, 466 P.2d at 257, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
170. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 664 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
171. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 19, at 591-92.
172. See Carrington v. Rash, 308 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
173. See, e.g., id.
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interest.' 74 The maintenance of a single language electoral system is
necessary to achieve administrative convenience and efficiency, but
since the Supreme Court has refused to recognize state administrative
benefit as compelling, the interest fails under the strict scrutiny review.
Application of the strict scrutiny standard to the second state interest,
encouraging non-English speaking citizens to learn English, renders
a similar result. This state interest in encouraging non-English speak-
ing citizens to learn English is a desirable goal,' 7 but will likely fall
short of becoming a compelling state interest. To establish the com-
pelling nature for all United States citizens to speak English, the
government must come forward with sufficiently convincing proof to
justify the abridgment of the fundamental right to vote. Since the
birth of this nation, the United States has been a place of social and
cultural assimilation.'76 Blending of culture and language is an asset
that should not be restricted by legislation that does not reflect the
social make-up of the country. Therefore, the evidence propounded
by the government likely will be inadequate to establish the compel-
ling need for all citizens to understand English.
Even if the Court were to find this state interest compelling,
however, the second strict scrutiny prong of necessity still must be
met. 77 Necessity requires that a close nexus exist between the state
objective and the means sought to achieve that objective. '78 If alter-
natives exist that will promote the state interest without infringing
upon a fundamental right, the second prong will not be satisfied and
the proposed legislation will fail strict scrutiny review.'" Applying
the above discussion, alternative means to encourage non-English
speaking citizens to learn English without directly impacting upon their
fundamental right to vote should be analyzed. For example, bilingual
education, implemented to convey language minorities into the common
tongue, common allegiance of English, is a viable alternative that pro-
motes the same interest without infringing upon the fundamental right
to vote.' Therefore, the second state interest also fails under the
strict scrutiny test.
174. See J. NowAc, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 19, at 592; see also Kramer
v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969). A similar requirement is applied in
the commerce clause cases. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
354 (1950).
175. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
176. See generally Wagner, supra note 97 (describing the social make-up of early America).
177. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See generally McFadden, Bilingual Education and the Law, 12 J. LAW & ED. 1, 1-27
(1983); Levin, The Courts, Congress, and Educational Adequacy: The Equal Protection Predica-
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From the foregoing application of the equal protection strict scrutiny
test to the proposed all English ballot, the asserted state interests do
not adequately meet the compelling status required by constitutional
interpretation nor is the legislation necessary to achieve the asserted
state interest.'8 ' The above discussion places the proposed goal of
Initiative Statute 38 into serious constitutional question. Whether an
English-only voting ballot similarly will violate the California state
constitution also should be analyzed.
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Despite the early Spanish culture of California, the original state
constitution provided that all official writings be in English only.'82
Although this section later was repealed,' 83 a similar statement can
be seen throughout the current California Code.'84 The California
Supreme Court addressed the issue of a mandatory bilingual ballot
in the 1970 case of Castro v. State of California.'85 In holding
California no longer could exclude Spanish literates from the polls,'
8 6
the court refused to require the state to adopt a bilingual electoral
system. 8 7 The court asserted that the interest of the state in main-
taining a single language system was substantial,' 8 and concluded that
providing voting ballots and materials in Spanish was not necessary
to the formation of intelligent opinions on election issues or implement-
ing those views through the voting process.' 89
Notwithstanding the opinion of many Californians, as expressed
through Initiative Statute 38, a California court likely would reach
a different conclusion today. As discussed in the previous section,
the fundamental right to vote has been interpreted broadly by federal
ment, 39 MD. L. REv. 187, 211 (1979) (describing the overall function of bilingual education
in the United States).
181. See supra notes 166-81 and accompanying text. This conclusion should not be surpris-
ing since the rigorous "compelling state interest" standard applied has been called by Chief
Justice Burger as demanding "nothing less than perfection." See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 363 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
182. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, §22 (1879) (repealed in 1966).
183. Id.
184. See CAL. FOOD & AGRic. CODE §11; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11; CAL. EDUC. CODE
§30; CAL. ELEC. CODE §7; CAL. FiN. CODE §8; CAL. FISH & GAM CODE §7; CAL. H AR. &
NAy. CODE §8; CAL. HEALTH & Sarvm CODE §8; CAL. INS. CODE §8; CAL. LAB. CODE §8;
CAL. Mn. & VET. CODE §8; CAL. PUB. Rs. CODE §8; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §8; CAL. REv.
& TAx CODE §8; CAL. STS. & HY. CODE §8; CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §8; CAL. VEH. CODE §9;
CAL. WATER CODE §8; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §8.
185. 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970).
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courts to include the right to effectively cast one's vote.," California
courts have held consistently that while the equal protection provisions
of the California Constitution' 9' are independent of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution, these provi-
sions are substantially equivalent.' 9 2 Equal protection questions under
the California Constitution will be decided by the identical standards
discussed in the federal analysis.' 93 Thus, if a California court were
to apply the strict scrutiny analysis the equal protection clause re-
quires, they too would find a lack of a necessary compelling state
interest to uphold an English-only ballot as constitutional.
CONCLUSION
The people of California recently have voiced their strong preference
for an English-only election ballot. For this preference to be realized,
existing federal law first must be repealed or amended. This writer
has demonstrated that English-only ballot legislation will confront
strong constitutional attack. An expanded view of the fundamental
right to vote, tested against the strict scrutiny approach equal protec-
tion demands, simply will not yield the requisite compelling state
interest. This result reflects the proposition that the protection of the
constitution extends to all citizens, not just to those who speak the
English language. The result also exhibits that while a monolingual
society may be highly advantageous, that goal cannot be coerced by
methods which conflict with the Constitution.
Marc Douglas Francis
190. See supra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
191. See CA. CoNsT. art. IV, §16; art. I, §7; art. I, §21.
192. See Reece v. Alcoholic Bev. Appeals Bd., 64 Cal. App. 3d 675, 679, 134 Cal. Rptr.
698, 701 (1976).
193. See supra notes 151-68 and accompanying text. California courts may grant more pro-
tection under the state constitution than federal courts under the federal equal protection analysis
by utilizing the constitutional principle of "independent and adequate state grounds." See J.
NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNo, supra note 19, at 95. The California Supreme Court has
declared:
[11n the area of fundamental civil liberties . we sit as a Court of last resort, sub-
ject only to the qualification that our interpretations may not restrict the guarantees
accorded the national citizenry under the federal charter. In such constitutional ad-
judication, our first referent is California law and the full panoply of rights Califor-
nians have come to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded
respectful consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only when they
provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366 (1976).
See generally Falk, Foreword: The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Non-federal
Ground, 61 CAIsF. L. REv. 273, 275 (1973); Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground,
45 So. CAL. L. REv. 750, 750-55 (1972) (explaining the principle of adequate and independent
state grounds).
1046
